1) INTRODUCTION
For economic geographers, the enduring importance of geographic proximity in meditating knowledge flows is an oxymoron. Why is it, that despite advances in communication technologies and transport technologies that geographic proximity still matters? Or that, despite the ease of technology transfer certain regions have remained the epicentre of innovation while others have either failed to catch up or fallen behind? One particular claim is that a number of "geographical biases" lie at the root of regional development (Boschma, 2017) . At the regional level, these biases reflect organised communities of practices (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006) , untraded interdependencies (Storper, 1995) and institutional arrangements (Bathelt and Glückler, 2013) all of which contribute to -and reinforce -a series of place-based assets. Unravelling these biases has become a focal point throughout regional studies as it reveals the complex geo-centric processes that lie at the heart of knowledge creation and regional diversification (Boschma and Frenken, 2012) .
It is true that advancements in communication technologies have enabled certain
firms to lower their production costs and operate in a seemingly footloose fashion. But this is a cautionary tale, whose effects are not uniformly felt. In particular, the capabilities and inputs of technological sophisticated firms are more nuanced and complex. They compete on the basis of product differentiation and innovation (Feldman and Kogler, 2010) .
Differentiating between the two, distinguishes between firms that exploit codified knowledge i.e. ubiquitous and footloose, and firms that exploit tacit knowledge i.e. non-ubiquitous and spatially sticky (Gertler, 2003) . Incidentally, as knowledge has become more complex and its production more specialised a premium will continue to be placed on physical interactions as tacit knowledge suffers from a steep distance decay (Howells, 2002; Boschma, 2005) .
In this vein, a recent contribution by has suggested that not all types of knowledge are equal, drawing attention to the fact that certain technologies are more or less valuable than others. In doing so, the authors challenge a worrying tendency among economic geographers to merely focus on the quantity of knowledge inputs, without appropriately considering the quality of the knowledge produced. Following these insights, and with the development of more sophisticated databases several authors have begun developing more systematic ways at evaluating the value of new technological knowledge (Quatraro, 2010; Kogler et al., 2013 , Rigby 2015 . Particularly influential in this regard is the emerging framework of technological relatedness (Whittle and Kogler, 2017) , which has recently found residence alongside the writings of economic complexity (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009; Hidalgo, 2015) and the branching capabilities of regions (Penrose, 1959; Boschma and Frenken, 2012) .
Against this backdrop, the primary aim of this paper is to analyse the evolution of knowledge complexity in Irish NUTS3 regions over the period 1981 -2010. More so for Ireland than any other developed economy is its topical relationship with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Here, the principle question has always been, do local or foreign firms contribute more to the technological development of regional economies? Following Balland and Rigby (2017) 1 we build a 2-mode structural network to develop a knowledge complexity index (KCI) for Irish regions. The KCI is based on more than 3,500 patent records from the European Patent Office (EPO), and combines information on the technological structure of eight NUTS3 regions and the 35 aggregate technologies in which they have a Relative
Technological Advantage (RTA). The KCI quantifies the complexity of the knowledge produced by each region, and thereafter extrapolates whether it is 'sticky ' (non-ubiquitous) enough to only be produced in a few key regions, or if it is spatially footloose.
Our results indicate that the most complex technologies tend to be produced in a few diverse regions. For Ireland, these technologies are almost exclusively produced in Dublin, and or, the South-West and the Midlands region. Secondly, the majority of this complex knowledge is generated in technology classes where the share of foreign activity is greater than local firms. Lastly, we generate an entry model to compute the process of complex regional diversification. Complex regional diversification is fundamentally different to related diversification insofar as it examines how a region develops a comparative advantage in a technological domain more complex than those already present in that region. As such, we focus our attention only on those technologies with the highest KCI values, as these technologies are said to underpin the European Union's Smart Specialisation thesis (Foray et al., 2009; McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2013; .
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the key literatures of technological relatedness and knowledge complexity. Section 3 describes the use of patent data as well as the fundamental principles of knowledge complexity. Developing on this, Sections 4 and 5 operationalise the knowledge complexity index and address the papers main research questions. Section 6 is the model itself while Section 7 concludes and highlights some future research direction.
2) LITERATURE REVIEW
Two phenomenon characterise modern society. Firstly, that the production of economically valuable knowledge is central to economic prosperity and long term regional development (Schumpeter, 1939; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Lundvall, 1992; Metclafe, 1994; Hodgson, 2004) . Secondly, that this type of knowledge is geographically bound (Jaffe et al., 1993; Almeida and Kogut, 1997; Zucker et al., 1998; Breschi and Lissoni, 2009; Thompson et al., 2005; Sonn and Storper, 2008) . Taken together, these two characterises -and extensions thereof -have cultivated in what is now commonly known as the "evolutionary turn" in economic geography (Grabher, 2009) . At the core of this evolutionary approach, is an appreciation of the role of history in explaining how, experiences and competencies acquired over time determine present configurations as well as future regional trajectories (Kogler, 2015) . Evolutionary theorists have long considered the importance of history in explaining regional development, as it provides a framework for understanding the uneven spatial distribution of socio-economic realities as a path dependent phenomena characterized by the recombination of related (Dosi and Nelson, 2010) and unrelated activities (Castaldi et al., 2015) .
This view of regional development through related diversification is not exclusive to economic geography. The seminal contribution of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and more recently Hausmann et al., (2011) and Hidalgo (2015) retain these geographical arguments, while simultaneously introducing a complex dimension to the study of regional diversification. Here complexity is defined iteratively, using information on the diversity of countries that make a product and the ubiquity of other products that that country produces (for a more in depth discussion see Hidalgo, 2015) . Combing insights from complex systems (Simon, 1962) and network complexity (Barabási, 2011) , the principle argument is that disparities in economic growth can be explained by the ubiquity (complexity) of capabilities present in a countries, as more complex products reside in a fewer countries. Extending these arguments to a regional level, the uneven spatial distribution of socio-economic activities and the lumpiness of knowledge production (Rigby, 2015) is therefore not simply a by-product of the economic diversity of that region, but more importantly by the complexity of the knowledge and know-how embedded in its networks. In their pan European study, Antonellia et al., (2016) find evidence to this effect demonstrating that it is not just related knowledge that matters for the generation of new knowledge, but above all else, the relative scarcity of specific subsets of knowledge present in individual regions. draw similar conclusions while mapping the geography of complex knowledge in the US. They find that regional differences can be explained not just in terms of technological diversify, but more importantly by the amount of complex (tacit) knowledge embedded in that region.
In addition, they also find that not all knowledge is equal and provide new insights into the increasing importance of geographical proximity in the globalised economy. Indeed, while less complex knowledge might be considered footless. Complex knowledge, which ultimately underpins long terms competitive advantage retains a strong geographical dimension resulting in its production being carried in a select few regions (Markusen, 1996; Gertler, 2003; Boschma, 2017) .
The popularity of this geographic dimension is echoed in the successes of a number of key industries; ICT in Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) , fuel cell technology in the BadenWuerttemberg region (Tanner, 2014) , speciality wine in Piedmont (Morrison and Rabellotti, 2009 ) or the media cluster in Leipzig (Bathelt, 2005 (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009 ). Hausmann and colleagues refer to these capabilities as "modularized chunks of embedded knowledge" (Hausmann et al., 2011, p. 17) , colloquially known as the person-byte, but it can also include other institutional, cultural and social amenities (O'Cleary, 2016) .
A useful analogy for conceptualising the embeddedness of an region (and by extension its complexity), is trying to move a jig-saw puzzle containing many pieces from one table to another. Its intricate makeup results in the pieces of the jig-saw beginning to fall as you try and move it. This implies that the difficulty in moving a jig-saw puzzle -like an industry -increases with the number of components (Hidalgo, 2015) . A more optimal solution would be to move the jig-saw in smaller pieces to a (Neffke et al., 2011; Rigby, 2015) . Using information of the co-occurrence of technology classes listed on patent documents, the knowledge space is an intuitive way to model the processes of technological specialisation/diversification of a regional economy. Prior research for the US knowledge space has linked relatedness between technologies to faster rates of patenting per worker (Kogler et al. 2013) , while Rigby (2015) found that technologies that where related to the regions an existing knowledge base had a high probability to enter that region that those technologies that did not. In a not too dissimilar vein, Boschma et al., (2013) have also demonstrated that the probability of a US metropolitan area gains a new technology class increased by 30% if the level of relatedness with existing technologies in the city increases by 10%, while the exit probability of an existing technology decreases by 8%. Similar results were also found by Tanner (2014 Tanner ( , 2016 for the growth of fuel cell technologies throughout Europe, for nanotechnologies in European regions (Colombelli et al. 2014) and for the spatial diffusion of the rDNA technology across US metropolitan regions (Feldman et al. 2015) .
The thread that connects the literatures of economic complexity and technological relatedness is the intuition that certain types of knowledge are more or less mobile than others, and that this mobility is in part reflected by the complexity of that technology. Early attempts by Fleming (2001) and Fleming and Sorenson (2001) to measure the complexity of technologies suggest a landscape of recombinant search, akin to the fitness landscape models proposed by Kauffman (1993) 2 . Their proxy for complexity is the difficulty that arises when 2 The idea behind the fitness landscape was originally developed by the biologist Sewall Wright in 1932 and was used to visualize the relationship between genotypes and reproductive success. Since then, it has been adapted by complexity and evolutionary theorists as a means to understand complex evolutionary patterns.
trying to recombine different technology classes listed on patent documents. In more recent applications, Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) develop a measure of complexity based on the diversity of countries that make a product, and the ubiquity of other products that that country produces. Moving down the geographical scale, develop an eigenvector approach of the original methodology and map the geography of complex knowledge throughout the US. The current investigation utilises the methodology outlined in , while introducing an additional element, namely; whether more complex knowledge is created by local or foreign firms. Not least since Bathelt et al., (2004) has the importance of non-local networks been recognised throughout economic geography.
Along these lines, Neffke and colleagues have challenged seemingly superior nature of local versus non-local knowledge flows for enacting structural change. In the authors' own words, they argue beyond local interactions, demonstrating that "radical structural change predominantly depends on non-local firms and entrepreneurs transferring new activities to the region" (Neffke et al., 2014, p. 4) . Findings such as these are becoming increasingly common throughout economic geography with a growing body of literature now explicitly focusing on the role of non-local actors and their ability to introduce external types of knowledge (OwenSmith and Powell, 2004; Giuliani, 2011; Breschi and Lenzi, 2015; Zhu et al., 2015) . In spite of this, no such investigation has yet to consider the role played by foreign firms in generating more or less complex knowledge. This study endeavours to address this gap.
Finally, getting accurate information on technological knowledge is not easy, but it is possible. The difficulty is that knowledge is an intangible good. You cannot hold knowledge the same way you can hold an apple or cycle a bike. This scepticism is aptly summarised by Paul Krugman (1991, p. 53) , when stating that "knowledge flows are invisible; they leave no paper trail to which they may be measured or tracked". In defiance of this, Jaffe et al., (1993, p. 578) demonstrate that "knowledge flows do sometimes leave a paper trail", in the form of patent citations, and in doing so demonstrate a way to trace the production of knowledge over space and through time (Almeida and Kogut, 1997; Sonn and Storper, 2008) . While the current investigation does not use patent citation analysis, it does employ patent statistics to analysis the evolution of complex knowledge. More specifically it takes advantage of the individual technology classes listed on patent documents and derives a measure of complexity based off the ubiquity of these classes and the diversity of regions that produce them . Finally, that patents are an imperfect and limited measure of economic and innovative activity are well known (Pavitt, 1984; Griliches,1990) .
Nevertheless, it is generally well accepted that patents -as a proxy of innovation -provide a good indication of the processes of knowledge creation and diffusion, especially on a regional level (Acs et al., 2002) . They also provide key insights into the organisational activities of those actively involved in the production of new knowledge (Usai, 2011) .
) KNOWLEDGE COMPLEXITY NETWORK
Networks have always played a formative role in economic geography (Glückler, 2007) . In the past, the study of network dynamics has provided key insights into the transfer of knowledge between firms (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005) , for social networks (Breschi and Lissoni, 2009 ) and for scientific collaborations between European regions (Hoekman et al., 2010) . At the same time, the recent geographical turn has cultivated a more spatial perspective directed at understanding the formation and evolution of these ties (Boschma and Frenken, 2012) . Influential in this line of enquiry was the contribution of Bathelt et al., (2004) who questioned whether local or non-local networks matter most for economic growth? Consequently, it has been argued that what matters most for regional development are approaches the strategize a more open ended and collaborative approach to innovation, as no single firm/industry has the capacity to generate all the knowledge they require internally (Neffke et al., 2014) . Examining the role of knowledge gatekeepers for the expansion of U.S.
cities, Breschi and Lenzi (2015, p. 783) , demonstrate that,
Dense interactions at the local level (i.e. local buzz) combined with embeddedness in global networks (i.e. global pipelines) allow one to exploit the advantages deriving from trusted and repeated ties at the local level with non-redundant information deriving from external sources.
Armed with such a logic, the primary aim of this paper questions whether the more valuable (complex) knowledge is generated by local or foreign firms? To do this, requires a network that links technologies and regions. This requirement lends itself to the formation of a modified bipartite graph (Borgatti 2009; ; which in addition to connecting technologies and regions, also links these technologies to their country of origin
To construct the knowledge complexity network, we make use of patent data from the European Patent Office (EPO) for the years 1981 -2010, and information on the country of origin, provided by Bureau van Dijk's FAME database. The use of patent statistics has a long tradition within economic geography, with their popularity being directly relating to the wealth of information contained within individual patent documents (Rigby, 2000) .
Furthermore, since our investigation is primarily concerned with the formation of new knowledge, as well as the organisational processes that results in this production, patent data has been listed as an excellent source of information (Usai, 2011) . More technically, we make use of two distinct pieces of information, the 629 primary technology classes (T nodes in Figure 1 ) and their corresponding NUTS3 region (R nodes in Figure 1 ).
Next to ascertain which type of firm -local or foreign -is generating the more complex knowledge we need reliable information on that firm. To do this we make use of the FAME database provided by Bureau van Dijk. Among other things, this database contains information on the ownership, finance and governance of Irish firms. This enables us to 3 A detailed and thorough explanation of distinguishing between local or non-local will be explained in the following sections. Despite advances in visualisation techniques, network algorithms and databases, networks will only ever be able to provide preliminary insights into the development of regions and the evolution of technologies . A richer discussion requires a more systematic framework, one that combines information on both the geography and complexity of technology classes. It is to these questions that this paper now turns. 
) MEASURING KNOWLEDGE COMPLEXITY
So how would one go about measuring complexity? According to, Nicolas and Prigogine (1989, p. 36 ) the immediate problem associated with complexity is a theoretical one, insofar as, "complexity is one of those ideas whose definition is an integral part of the problems that it raises". The second problem, at least in economic geography is more empirical, reflecting a lack of suitable data sources for such investigations. Fortunately, many of these concerns have recently been addressed as previously underutilised information in several databases are now readably been exploited (Hidalgo et al., 2007; Neffke et al., 2011; Kogler et al., 2013) .
Developing on the region-technology matrix outlined above, Figure 3 . provides a more direct interpretation of the technological composition of Irish NUT3 regions. As has become commonplace, we only focus on those regions that have a technological advantage in a given technology . Put differently, , ( ) = 1 if:
Nevertheless, the sheer presence of absence of an RTA does not comment on the complexity of this knowledge, or whether that knowledge was generated by local or foreign firm. In pursuit of these goals, requires a methodology that simultaneously combines information the diversity of regions and the ubiquity of technologies produced.
A fertile starting point for these discussions is the method of reflections methodology developed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) . This is a novel approach which infers the complexity of capabilities underlying an economy by combining information on countries and products. In a similar fashion, use USPTO patent data to map the complexity of technologies produced within MSAs. Following Caldarelli et al., (2013) these authors developed an alternative measure of complexity using an eigenvector reformulation of the original methodology. More specifically, their measure of complexity is computed as the second largest eigenvector of the region-technology matrix and combines information on the diversity of regions (i.e. number of patents produced by a region) (see Albeaik et al., 2017 , for a more technical summary).
and 2) the ubiquity of their technologies (i.e. the number of regions with an RTA in the technology).
Using this information, the current investigation advances this line of enquiry while introducing two additional elements. Firstly, seen as this paper is chiefly concerning with whether more complex knowledge is generated by local or foreign firms, we have endeavoured to delineate between the two in manners previously discussed. Secondly, whereas the contribution of primarily focused on unravelling the geography of complex knowledge, in terms of which cities produced the most complex 
By combining information on the diversity regions and the ubiquity of technologies, the method of reflections methodology calculates jointly and iteratively the average of the proceeding measures. Or to put it more simply, each additional iteration in equation (4) and equation (5) makes use of the others calculation for the previous step. Since this paper primarily focuses on the complexity of technologies, additional iterations = 2 … 3 … 20 in equation (5) provides a more detailed measure of the complexity of a given technology by using information of the diversity of regions that have a technological advantage in that technology.
5) TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY IN THE IRISH KNOWLEDGE SPACE
Developing on the methodology outlined above, the remainder of this paper shifts its attention towards answering the primary research question, namely; whether more valuable (complex) knowledge is generated by local or non-local firms? Theory argues that the relationship between complex technologies and complex regions are essentially two sides of the same coin. This symbiotic relationship boils down to the fact the advanced regions produce complex technologies and that complex technologies are produced by more advanced regions. technologies are produced in more diversified regions, while ubiquitous technologies can be easily produced by many regions. Intuitively this makes sense, as diverse regions have at their disposal a wide range of 'capabilities' from which they can produce more complex structures, whereas technologically specialised regions would struggle to meet these demands 6 Hausmann et al., (2011) .
Using information on the mean complexity (vertical line) and mean diversity (horizontal line) it is possible to dissect the graph into four quadrants. In the bottom left quadrant are the less complex (ubiquitous) technologies that are produced in more specialised regions (Textiles, Transport and Other Machines). Similarly, the bottom right quadrant is equally as specialised but the type of technologies produced in these regions are a lot more sophisticated, meaning that imitation is highly unlikely due to their complex structure (Medical Technologies and Biotechnology). Moving up the y-axis reveals a more diversified 6 There are of course exceptions to this rule, but generally speaking the most complex technologies are produced in regions with a highly diverse knowledge base. where for Nanotechnology where foreign activity is three times higher than local firms.
Indeed, it is particularly interesting to note that the majority of complex technologies (KCI < 80) are generated in classes where foreign firms are most active. Among others, these technologies have been identified both nationally (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, 2015, 2016) and internationally (OECD, 2015) as the key enabling technologies of the future and, as those technologies that underpin the smart specialisation thesis (Foray et al., 2011; Heimeriks and Balland, 2016) . This is not to argue that only foreign firms are generating complex technologies.
Measurements consistently ranks as one of the most sophisticated technologies in the Irish knowledge space (KCI > 90), and its share of foreign activity is less than 40%. Similarly, the share for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals are equally low, while their KCI is greater than 75. Lastly, and just as important, Figure 5 . also reveals a cluster of moderately complex technologies (KCI <50) with a comparatively equal share of engagement, namely; Medical Technologies, Macromolecular Chemistry and Materials Chemistry.
Developing on these ideas, Although beyond the scope of this paper, there are a series of important geographical implications to these arguments. In their pioneering paper, Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) link product complexity at a country levels to higher levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), indicating that those regions that export more complex products tend also to be more prosperous. Extending these arguments to a regional scale, , find wide geographic variations in knowledge complexity of US MSAs with relatively few regions being able to produce the most complex technologies. To this effect, the final column in Table 1 provides information on the NUTS3 regions in which these technologies reside.
The vast majority of these technologies are present in Dublin and either in the South-West or Midlands. These regions where specifically targeted to spearhead Ireland's three cluster approach throughout the 1980s so it is not surprising that these technologies are found there (Culliton, 1992; Clancy et al., 2001) . This process describes how the evolution of the space economy is driven by a series of micro-geographic/economic interactions that "forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing" (Schumpeter, 1943, p. 64) . Indeed, deciphering the ebb and flow processes of technological change, has become a cornerstone throughout evolutionary economic geography with a series of recent contributions focusing explicitly on how technologies enter and exit regions (see, Kogler et al., 2016; Rigby 2015; . Thus, it is logical to reason that the complexity of these technologies will change as new technological structures rise to prominence and as old ones' decline. those more commonly associated with foreign firms (excluding Measurements), which serves as an indicator to which type of firms are generating the more complex knowledge.
From the previous discussions, we know that those regions capable of producing complex technologies enjoy a position of economic stature, and given the profit motif that necessitates innovation, this usually arises in their ability to extract quasi-monopolistic rents (Schumputer, 1939) . It is therefore reasonable to assume that, given the opportunity regions would prefer to specialise in more complex technologies as opposed to more standardised ones. Translating this intuition into a regional policy directive would see policy makers favour policies of complex regional diversification over related diversification as this implies diversifying into a technological domain more complex than those already produced .
6) COMPLEX REGIONAL DIVERSIFICATION
At its core, complex diversification is the processes through which regions diversify into technological structures more complex than those already present in the region. In the final section of this paper, we present our main empirical results. Our panel is made up of Irelands 8 NUTS3 regions and the 10 most complex technologies as listed in Table 1 to also begin investigating these processes of complex diversification. To these ends, our model occupies two interrelated purposes 1) in its predictive power and 2) in the mechanisms it identifies.
We have already detailed at length the benefits that accompany complex technologies, which should act as a strong justification as to why regions would want to specialise in them.
The process of complex diversification is investigated using a panel version of a fixed effects entry model. The main variables of interest are Relatedness Density, which measures how related a complex technology is to the knowledge portfolio of a region (Balland, 2016b) .
Technological Complexity is the corresponding KCI for a given technology and
Technological Relatedness which capture the total "technological distance" between technologies . Summary statistics of these variables are shown below.
Due to the small and restricted sample size (which may downplay the effects of As to be expected, Relatedness Density exhibits a positive and significant effect throughout each of our models. This finding is in line with both the literatures of regional diversification and economic complexity, seen as, regions are more like to diversify into a complex technology, if that technology is related to a pre-existing set of capabilities already present in the region. Next, the sign for Technological Complexity is consistently negative and varies in significance. This is consistent with the idea that complex technologies are a desirable diversification option for regions, but, given their complex structure are inherently more difficult to diversity into (it is also likely that these effects have been magnified given that the dependent variable only includes the ten most complex technologies, and the overall small sample size, N = 160). Similarly, the effects of Technological Relatedness fluctuates throughout each of the models. This would insinuate that it is not relatedness per se that matters for complex diversification, as there are a lot technologies that cannot be meaningful recombined to allow for more distant jumps in the knowledge space.
Model 5 and 6 include the full section of variables and the interaction term between
Technological Complexity and Technological Relatedness. As previously discussed, these complex technologies have already been shown to be highly related to one another. In both models the interaction between complexity and relatedness is positive and significant revealing a region is more likely to diversify into a complex technological domain if that technology is related to an existing set of technologies currently present in the region.
Time Fixed Effects
Finally, as a control, we include Active Employment which is a measure of active industrial employment based of Cambridge Econometrics (2015) and Knowledge Stock which is the number of patents in a region. The overall effects of both of these variables in our models are marginal.
Thus far in the literature it is fair to say that related diversification is the rule and seldom the exception (Neffke et al., 2011; . Nevertheless, it is becoming apparent that other forms of diversification -unrelated and complex -can no longer be overlooked as they have the capacity to address numerous issues beyond the scope of a purely related approach, not least when considering knowledge re-combination, radical technological change, path creation and regional resilience (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Christopherson et al., 2010; Tanner, 2014; Boschma and Capone, 2015; Castaldi et al., 2015; . Moreover, although many authors have commented on the long term limitations of related diversification, far fewer have provided any recommendations (Boschma, 2016) . In this regard, the results from Table 3 are an important first step in this direction. The inclusion of a complex dimension into regional diversification provides new insights in the branching and innovative capabilities of regions. At the same time, the application of these results has border implications throughout economic geography.
A prime example of this can be found alongside the European Union's Smart Specialisation thesis, which underpins long term growth and innovation policy throughout Europe. Smart specialization aims to enhance regional competitiveness by identifying and enabling those regions that have a particular 'strengths' in certain industries (technologies) (Foray et al., 2011) . Additionally, the thesis has also became embroiled with EU's funding allocation, principally in relation to H2020. The issue here is that there will always be more regions wanting to get funded, than funding available. So which regions (industries) should get funded? Current best practice favours the development of related industries, as these industries are better able to leverage their assets to meet future needs.
However, this should not be considered the only approach. In their recent contributions and query what the addition of a complex dimension would mean for the smart specialisation thesis as a whole. They poise that, regional innovation policy support should not only target related diversification, but also complex diversification which would enable regions to branch out into technologies more complex than those already produced. In this context, complex diversification simultaneously and has high economic, social, industrial and technological value (Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2010) . In the author's own words this would create bottom-up policy which enables regions to "leverage their existing capabilities to develop and secure comparative advantage in related high-value-added activities" (Balland et al., 2017, p. 24) .
7) CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Increasingly, the extent to which firms (and by extension regions) prosper or perish is entrenched with how well they access, absorb and assimilate various types of knowledge.
This is not to say that other resources no longer matter, because they do. Just that, for a growing number of firms their survival is closely related to the types of knowledge they are capable of producing. This understanding that firms compete on the quality of knowledge they produce treats knowledge as a heterogeneous agent, implying that certain types of knowledge are more or less valuable than others.
Throughout this study we investigated the complexity of this knowledge -as proxied by patents -and whether or not more complex knowledge was generated by local or foreign firms. Using the method of reflections methodology we examined the share of patenting activities of firms to ascertain which type of firm was generating more complex technologies.
Results show that, of the ten most complex technologies in the Irish knowledge space, that seven of them are in technology classes in which the share of foreign activity is greater than 55%. This peaks for Nanotechnology, which is both the most complex technology (KCI = 100) and has the highest share of foreign activity (75%). That been said, this does not mean that foreign firms are exclusively producing complex technologies. Measurements consistently ranks as one of the most complex technologies and its share of foreign activity is consistently below 40%. Similarly, Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals have a low rates of foreign activity and high KCI values.
Another important contribution of this study examined how the complexity of these technologies changed over time. Indeed, the same way the complexity of regions evolve so too does the complexity of technologies embedded in these regions as new technological structures rise to prominence and as old ones' decline. Again, Nanotechnology and Measurements provide good illustrations of this process. Throughout much of the 1980s these technologies where among the least complex, primarily because their socio-economic potential had yet to be realised. Yet, two decades later these technologies are consistently ranked among the most complex (both within Ireland and the EU), and are also the technologies that underpin the European Union's Smart Specialisation thesis.
In terms of future research this paper presented a model of complex regional diversification. Similar to radical innovations and unrelated regional branching, complex diversification does not conform with the teachings of evolutionary economic geography. As such, it requires a separate framework of analysis and one that explicitly considers how the complexity of technologies influence the evolution of regions. As previously discussed, the intuition behind complex diversification is fairly straightforward, chiefly, given the chance regions would prefer to diversify into more complex technological domains than those they currently specialise in. For Ireland, what matters most when trying to enact complex diversification is relatedness density. Complex technologies are more likely to enter a region when those (complex) technologies are already related to the knowledge base of a region.
Next, in and of themselves the effects of complexity and relatedness exert an overall negative impact. However, when these effects are interacted their presence becomes positive and significant revealing that diversifying into a complex technological structure can be facilitated if the diversification process builds on a series of capabilities already present in the region.
Lastly, we would argue that this complex dimension has important bearings on regional development and innovation policies. Complexity ushers in a new framework through which regional economic policy should not only favour related diversification (specialization) per se, but should also target complex (unrelated) diversification as this would enable regions to jump further and into technological structures more complex than those already produced. Economic geographers have long recognised the value and importance of radical technologies and their ability to change current technological paradigms. Here we wish to extend these discussions to include a complex dimension.
